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The works of the philosopher Herbert Marcuse form the basis for 
this inquiry into the possibility of human happiness. The thesis 
explores the social, psychological and philosophical basis for 
the establishment of a general happiness. It also seeks to clar­
ify the inherent obstacles and limitations to such a condition. 
Beginning with an examination of the hedonistic and eudaemonistic 
traditions, the study explores the underlying relationship be­
tween the exercise of reason and the premise of happiness.
The necessary connection between reason, happiness and social 
justice in Plato's philosophy was reflected in the development of 
Marcuse's critical theory of society. It was the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of Karl Marx, however, which provided 
him with a radically new understanding of the essence of man and 
the proper use of reason. He made use of Marx's dialectical ma­
terialism to analyze the objective changes in social organization 
necessary for the realization of a general human happiness.
In the 1930's, Marcuse believed that the prospects for the free 
satisfaction of human needs were at hand. The rise of fascism and 
the Holocaust, however, shattered any faith he might have had in 
the inevitability of proletarian revolution. In the 1940's, he 
turned his attention to the works of Sigmund Freud in an attenpt 
to understand the irrational farces within the human psyche which 
had permitted the rise of fascism.
In Eros and Civilization and subsequent works, Marcuse argued 
that under the ideal conditions of mature industrial society, hu­
man agressiveness could be replaced by an aesthetic ethos which 
placed the pursuit of happiness above competitive economic pur­
suits. This study explores the principal themes of his critical 
theory, with an emphasis on the relationship between his concep­
tion of instinctual liberation and the possibility of happiness.
Marcuse also explored the power of authentic works of art to 
instill in individuals a vital need for radical change. In the 
end, however, he held that death represents an ultimate obstacle 
to the goal of lasting happiness. In the final chapter of the 
thesis, the relationship between time and happiness is examined 
in light of the tendencies within society which may increase the 
possibility for greater human happiness. While Marcuse's critical 
theory has not resolved the problem of unhappiness, it does rep­
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THE CRITICAL THEORY OF HERBERT MARCUSE:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN HAPPINESS
INTRODUCTION
The question of human happiness has been of enduring interest to 
philosophers since the time of Plato and Aristotle. In our time, the 
philosopher Herbert Marcuse made the inquiry into the possibility of 
happiness a cornerstone of his critical theory of society. This thesis 
will explore Marcuse's treatment of the question of human happiness as 
it relates to his overall social theory.
Marcuse's interest in the problem of social unhappiness led him to 
re-examine the works of previous thinkers on this subject. Aristotle, 
for example, maintained that happiness represented the proper final end 
far mankind. Hedonist and utilitarian philosophers argued that happi­
ness, measured by the ratio of pleasure to pain, constituted the only 
thing good in itself. Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages and the 
moral philosophy of the bourgeois period, while emphasizing duty, also 
produced a promise of happiness. According to Marcuse, however, it was 
a false premise which could not cure the discord within society.
While the goal of happiness has represented a perennial concern, 
understanding of the nature of happiness has varied significantly.
For Plato and Aristotle, the term eudaemonia characterized happiness in 
the sense that one possessed those things worth having and engaged in 
activities which were morally virtuous. Because they believed that the 
capacity to reason represented mankind's unique and highest endowment, 




of reason, they maintained that happiness could be attained only 
through the use of reason. The irrationality of sensual satisfactions 
marked them as dubious contributors to eudaemonia. This definition 
stands in sharp contrast with one version of hedonism which defined 
happiness as the satisfaction of whatever desires an individual might 
possess.
Marcuse's critical theory ccmbined features of eudaemonism with 
the hedonistic protest against the repression of sensuality. He argued 
that some needs are better satisfied than others and that individual 
happiness cannot be separated from the creation of a rational society. 
His criticism of hedonism was based on the conviction that purely 
subjective gratification in the face of general misery is incompatible 
with the need to abolish that misery.
In defense of hedonism, Marcuse maintained that in the hedonistic 
protest against the repression of sensuality is preserved the possi­
bility of a general happiness. According to his theory, human happi­
ness requires both the gratification of instinctual inpulses and the 
exercise of reason.
Whether one subscribes to a eudaemonistic or to a hedonistic 
conception of happiness, any characterization of happiness must entail 
the satisfaction of some human need or desire. The repression of human 
needs would, therefore, tend to give rise to a state of unhappiness.
Marcuse's first exposition on the subject of happiness was con­
tained in an essay entitled "On Hedonism" which was published in 
1938.1 in it, he examined the problematic of happiness and provided 
a critique of what he termed 'the philosophy of reason.'
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For Marcuse, the organization of Western civilization has been 
shaped by the political, economic, moral and scientific theories made 
possible by a philosophy of reason. This philosophy originated in 
Plato and Aristotle's preoccupation with reason as man's essential 
nature. Because they equated the highest good exclusively with the 
exercise of reason, they came to regard the pursuit of sensual grat­
ification as something evil. Both philosophers branded as irrational 
the appetitive and instinctual elements of the human constitution.
According to Marcuse, the conflict between reason and sensuality 
expressed in the works of Plato and Aristotle greatly contributed to 
the development of repressive morality and hierarchical social or­
ganization. It also served to justify a capitalist mode of economic 
organization which made efficient operation more important than human 
happiness.
Marcuse linked the philosophy of reason to "the development of the 
productive forces, the free rational shaping of the conditions of 
life, the domination of nature, and the critical autonomy of the 
associated individuals.... The idea of reason aims at universality, at 
a society in which the antagonistic interests of 'empirical' 
individuals are cancelled. "2
In contrast to the philosophy of reason, Marcuse argued that
hedonism "has stressed the comprehensive unfolding and fulfillment of
/individual wants and needs, emancipation from an inhuman labor 
process, and liberation of the world for the purposes of enjoy­
ment.... Hedonism wants to preserve the development and gratification 
of the individual as a goal within an anarchic and impoverished
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reality."^
Marcuse's critique of the philosophy of reason represents a key 
element of his critical theory and his consideration of the question 
of human happiness. By linking the philosophy of reason to the devel­
opment of the productive forces and the domination of nature, Marcuse 
was able to extend his critique to technology and what he termed 
'technological rationality'. It was not technology, per se, which was 
objectionable, but its utilization as a means of social domination. 
Like the philosophy of reason, technological rationality represented 
for Marcuse more of an attitude than a method. He argued that the 
deamination of nature, which technological rationality encouraged, also 
fosters the deamination of man. According to Marcuse, social domination 
has resulted in social unhappiness which can be alleviated only by a 
fundamental change in society itself.
Marcuse also saw the philosophy of reason at work in bourgeois 
morality, especially in Kant's moral philosophy. He criticized bour­
geois morality for its rejection of. individual happiness in favor of 
duty to universal laws which are indifferent to individual fate. In 
his analysis, since happiness can never be guaranteed in a contingent 
world, bourgeois morality placed the promise of happiness outside of 
society. He asserted that the possibility of happiness was preserved 
only in bourgeois art.
Marcuse's critical theory was significantly influenced by his 
reading of Marx, especially by such early works as the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts. Marx's analysis provided Marcuse with a 
conception of human nature which helped him to better grasp the
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question of happiness. Marx's materialist philosophy emphasized labor 
as the universal human activity. His theory of history provided a 
critique of the class nature of society, and he called for a revolu­
tion of the working class, or proletariat, as the means by which 
social domination could be eradicated.
Marx's analysis pointed to a division of labor which impoverishes 
the laborer, while denying to him any control over his work activity, 
as an objective basis for social unhappiness. His analysis of capi­
talism also provided a theory of social revolution which promised 
greater freedom and happiness by eliminating the capitalist division 
of labor. The Marxian conception of labor as man's essential nature 
represented for Marcuse a key element of any social theory which 
proposes not only to understand human nature, but to also influence 
the course of human events.
Marx's materialist philosophy represented for Marcuse an advance 
over the idealist philosophy of reason to the extent that it based its 
analysis on the real conditions under which men and women live. His 
critique of capitalism was also a call to action to the victims of 
capitalism. While bourgeois morality offered the promise of happiness 
in the life hereafter, Marxist theory envisioned human happiness with­
in a rational social order. It was not until after the proletarian 
revolution, predicted by Marx, failed to materialize in Western Europe 
that Marcuse turned his attention to other ideas.
As the revolutionary movements of the 1920's were shattered, 
Marcuse observed that "the end of a historical period and the horror 
of the one to came were announced in the simultaneity of the civil war
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in Spain and the trials in Moscow. "4 The rise of Nazism and the 
Holocaust led Marcuse to conclude that irrational forces within the 
human psyche oould lead to behavior clearly at odds with human self- 
interest. His search far an explanation for the support offered to 
Hitler by the German working class led him to the works of Freud.
Of particular interest to Marcuse were Freud's metapsychological 
speculations after 1920. Freud's theory of human instinctive behavior 
postulated the existence of both life and death instincts within the 
human psyche. The presence of death instincts represented, for Freud, 
a significant problem in that those instincts must be permanently 
repressed if civilization is to avoid chaos and barbarism. The theory 
of instincts was adopted by Marcuse despite the pessimistic implica­
tions it produced in Freud's work. In contrast to Freud, Marcuse re­
cast Thanatos, or the death instinct, not as the urge to death, but 
toward the elimination of pain. Consequently, as pain and misery were 
reduced, death "would cease to be an instinctual goal. "5
While Freud viewed the destructive instincts as largely immutable 
and forever in need of repression, Marcuse maintained that objective 
changes in social organization oould reduce the aggressive tendencies 
within the psyche and allow for a much greater measure of freedom and 
happiness. Thus, his critical theory of society developed in response 
to the challenges posed both by Marx and by Freud. His theory sought 
to reconcile the need for rational organization with the irrational 
demands of the human instinctual constitution.
The publication in 1955 of Marcuse's Eros and Civilization 
repressited one of the first efforts to reconcile the works of Marx
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and Freud. In it, he utilized his critical theory to demonstrate the 
objective possibilities for a non-repressive society. He argued for a 
'rational sensuality' which oould satisfy basic material needs through 
a rational distribution of the goods of society while also satisfying 
instinctual needs for peace and pleasure through the creation of an 
aesthetic sensibility.
Marcuse' s study of the human psyche in Eros and Civilization led 
him to the conclusion that only the imagination remained free from the 
farces which dominate society. The failure of the proletarian revolu­
tion confirmed for him the power of such repressive institutions as 
the church, the state and the multinational corporation. These in­
stitutions have propped up an order of scarcity and inequality at a 
time when the productive capacity of society could provide for the 
basic needs of all of its citizens. They have also created a permanent 
war economy which threatens the very survival of the human species. 
Because Marx's proletariat has dissolved as a revolutionary force, 
Marcuse turned his attention to the imagination in order to project a 
new historical subject for which revolution might constitute a vital 
need.
This theme was pursued in works such as An Essay on Liberation and 
Counter-Revolution and Revolt where Marcuse argued forcefully for a 
'new sensibility' which would place human happiness before competitive 
economic pursuits as the goal of social organization. He believed that 
the images of freedom and gratification preserved by the imagination 
oould be expressed in works of art. His subsequent turn to art repre­
sented an attenpt to indict existing reality in favor of its repress­
8
ed, but genuinely human possibilities.
In his final work, The Aesthethic Dimension, Marcuse maintained 
that art "is caimitted to an emancipation of sensibility, imagina­
tion, and reason in all spheres of subjectivity and objectivity. "6 
For Marcuse, aesthethic form came to replace Marx's proletariat as the 
determinate negation of existing society. Its coirmitment to beauty 
stands in sharp contrast to the present ugliness of post-industrial 
society and because of its coirmitment to beauty it plays a critical 
role in any atteirpt to reform society.
Marcuse's argument that aesthetic form had cane to replace the 
proletariat is significant because it represents the first socialist 
theory of revolution which lacked a revolutionary class. Many on the 
left have criticized Marcuse's turn to art as an abandonment of 
revolutionary praxis because he maintained that the individuals to 
which authentic art might appeal are socially anonymous.
What Marcuse's critics must bear in mind is the fact that he 
openly acknowledged the limitations of his critical theory. Marcuse 
noted that the coirmitment of art to beauty weakens the negation con­
tained in the art work. Enjoyment derived from great works of art 
provides a catharsis which cancels the indictment delivered by the 
work. In the aid, he argued that works of art are powerless to change 
the world.
In his last work, The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse also insisted 
that no society could transcend what is called chance or fate and that 
irresolvable contradictions and sorrow are inevitable. One reason for 
this conclusion is the fact of death which "denies once and for all
9
the reality of a non-repressive existence.
While this conclusion raises questions about the direction of 
Marcuse's critical theory, it does not remove happiness as the object 
of a rational society. The tragic features of existence have long been 
recognized in philosophy and Marcuse' s pessimistic conclusions must be 
carefully weighed in relation to the necessary task of ongoing social 
reconstruction.
The impulse to reform society is perennial and derives from 
certain uncritical judgments about the human condition. Every 
philosophical system rests on certain fundamental presuppositions 
which are not susceptible to logical demonstration. In Marcuse1s 
social philosophy, the claim that a general happiness ought to be 
realized in society serves as such a presupposition. Unless one 
accepts such a claim as true then it is impossible to argue that 
individuals ought to act in such a way as to attain happiness. For 
Marcuse, the validity of the claim that happiness should be attained 
enjoyed the same status as the claim that life is valuable or that 
life is preferable to death.
Marcuse's critical theory relies heavily upon judgments of a 
non-enpirical nature. For example, he held that the ontological 
distinction between essence and appearance also involves an ethical 
distinction between "is" and "ought". Truth cannot be described simply 
as what is, but more correctly as what ought to be. His critical 
theory relies upon the claim that truth is not described by the facts 
of social existence, but rather by their unrealized possibilities. 
Given this emphasis on possibility, Marcuse's reliance on the imagin­
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ation as the faculty which sees behind and beyond the facts of social 
existence is understandable.
Marcuse made use of his conception of truth as a means to better 
comprehend the possibilities for human happiness. He maintained that 
happiness requires knowledge of the truth. However, since knowledge of 
the present state of society is hardly conducive to happiness, he 
believed that we are confronted with a dileitma. Happiness requires 
knowledge, but knowledge leads to unhappiness. The way out of the 
dilemna, according to Marcuse, would ccsne from the creation of a 
rational society based on knowledge of the truth.
It is at this point that Marcuse's theory is most subject to 
criticism. If truth is described not by the facts, but by unrealized 
possibilities, then which possibilities should be counted as true? 
Marcuse did argue for a number of values which he believed should be 
incorporated into social existence. It is very problematic, however, 
to maintain that such a list of values will ever be universally ac­
cepted as true in any objective sense. While it is possible to accept 
his contention that human possibilities are never restricted to the 
facts of social existence, it will prove far more difficult to argue 
successfully for any particular set of values as higher or more true 
than another.
Marcuse's use of idealist conceptions must also be carefully 
scrutinized in order to avoid reliance on purely subjective judgments. 
When utilized as the normative basis for an objective analysis of 
social conditions, such judgments may lead to conclusions which not 
only are at odds with the facts, but which may be incompatible with
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the possibilities.
One idealist conception utilized by Marcuse was that of essence. 
His designation of happiness as an appropriate social goal rests upon 
the answer to another question: What is man? The question of whether 
or not mankind possesses sane unique and essential nature is as old as 
philosophy. As we have seen, Plato and Aristotle held that because 
only man possesses the capacity to reason, this characteristic repre­
sents our essence. Since they also believed that happiness requires 
the unimpeded use of human faculties, the highest good requires the 
use of reason in an act of conteirplation. Other philosophers, in var­
ious ways, have made a similar case for reason as humanity's essential 
attribute.
The argument for a concept of a uniquely human essence is a com­
plex one which goes to the heart of the problem of happiness. While a 
concept of essence holds great potential to indict the actual world in 
light of its better possibilities, the argument for reason as man's 
essential nature is fraught with difficulties. By elevating reason to 
the status of the highest good, Aristotle and others, at the same 
time, have devalued sensuality and the imagination. According to 
Marcuse, the subsequent repression of sensuality in the name of reason 
is a major cause of unhappiness.
The argument for a particular human essence can also be understood 
as an argument in favor of the exercise of one human faculty over 
another. If it is true that happiness results from the proper inte­
gration of all human faculties and capacities, then the argument for 
any distinctive human essence becomes part of the problem rather than
12
part of the solution to the question of happiness. It was, in fact, 
Marcuse's contention that reason and sensuality must be harmonized 
before happiness can be attained.
The problem of happiness is further compounded by the issue of 
false needs. Marcuse, following the eudaemonistic tradition init­
iated by Plato, maintained that it was possible to distinguish between 
'higher' and 'lower' and between 'true' and 'false' needs. He argued 
that a 'technological veil' blinded individuals from knowing what 
their true interests were and that it may be necessary to disrupt 
their choices in the interest of genuine freedom.
The issue of whether or not true human needs can be distinguished 
from false ones will occupy little attention in this study. With the 
exception of needs which are clearly destructive to the individual or 
to others, it is difficult to maintain that the gratification of the 
need to read poetry, for example, is inherently higher or lower than 
the need to engage in physical exercise. Although Marcuse argued for 
aesthetic consciousness as a higher need which is currently repressed 
by consumer society, the rational society projected by his critical 
theory would not restrict the free gratification of human needs, ex­
cept to the extent required to maintain social order.
Rather than arguing about what might constitute a higher need, 
this thesis will only seek to examine what objectively might be 
necessary to bring about greater human happiness. It will also exam­
ine the inherent limitations to social freedom and happiness which 
cast doubt on the efficacy of the entire project.
The goal of a truly rational society remains an unfinished pro-
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ject which may be unattainable. If freedom is a necessary condition 
for happiness, however, any attenpt to expand the realm of freedom 
would be significant. The alternative view, that individual happiness 
is compatible with social unfreedom, holds that inner peace and sat­
isfaction can be maintained alongside poverty, injustice and misery. 
According to Marcuse, by restricting freedom to the inner autonomy of 
the individual, bourgeois morality has determined that general 
happiness and a rational society are unattainable.
It should be understood that Marcuse never sought to describe an 
ideal society such as More's Utopia. He did describe the preconditions 
far a rational society; at the same time he acknowledged the necessity 
of social taboos and restraints. Marcuse understood freedom both as 
freedom from fear, anxiety and want and as freedom for the fullest 
development of human capabilities and sensibilities. The rational 
society projected by his critical theory would provide the greatest 
opportunity for the free development of human capabilities consistent 
with the need to maintain social order.
This thesis will examine the nature of happiness in both its 
subjective and objective manifestations. It will then explore the 
relationship between happiness and social justice as it develops in 
Marcuse's critical theory. Subsequent chapters will discuss Freud's 
theory of instinctive behavior, instinctual liberation and the 
aesthethic dimension. Finally, the relationship between time and 
happiness will be examined. This final chapter will conclude with ah 
analysis of the application of Marcuse's critical theory in light of 
the obstacles and opportunities for progressive social change.
THE NATURE OF HAPPINESS
The concept of happiness is difficult to grasp. While it is coirmon 
to hear people speak of being happy or sad, there is little agreement 
as to what the nature of happiness might be. According to Marcuse, 
"Happiness is not in the mere feeling of satisfaction but in the 
reality of freedom and satisfaction. Happiness involves knowledge: it 
is the prerogative of the animal rationale."1
In what sense does happiness involve knowledge? Surely, many of 
our happiest moments do not seem to be directly connected to rational 
activity. It often appears that the happiest among us are the most 
carefree, while those who are aware of the world's problems are the 
unhappiest. Because happiness is experienced subjectively as a sense 
of well-being, it has received more attention from the proponents of 
conformist psychology than from the advocates of progressive social 
change. However, if the goal of a rational society is greater human 
happiness, then it would seem crucial that political theorists study 
its nature.
Marcuse's conception of human happiness drew its inspiration from 
both the eudaemonistic and the hedonistic traditions. His eudaemonism 
held that certain activities were higher or more likely sources of 
happiness than others. His hedonism sought to preserve the world as an 
object of pleasure.
What is the nature of happiness? Happiness is commonly expressed 
as a sense of well-being. It has also been described as a state in
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which an individual has everything that he or she wants or, in the 
alternative, as a state in which there is nothing that the individual 
wants changed.
The tern 'want' is important in any discussion of the nature of 
happiness. For all human beings have wants. Individual happiness is 
directly related to an individual's ability to satify his or her 
wants. Of importance to any theory of happiness is the psychological 
fact that not all individuals have the same wants and, therefore, not 
all would find satisfaction in the same activities. The very fact that 
many individuals have wants whose satisfaction would conflict with the 
happiness of others makes clear that social unhappiness is a problem 
not readily solved.
Another difficulty in the developmeit of a theory of happiness 
concerns the question of measurement. Since happiness is a subjective 
sense of well-being, is it possible to know whether or not another 
individual is happy? Is it possible for an individual to be happy 
without knowing it? Aside from the issue of whether or not we can know 
the mental states of others, there is also the question of how to 
measure happiness over time.
Proponents of eudaemonism would tend to consider a life as a whole 
when determining whether or not there is happiness present. Aristotle 
argued that an individual should not consider himself truly happy un­
til the end of his life because seme tragedy could always destroy the 
happiness that he presently enjoys. The hedonistic emphasis on the 
ratio of pleasure to pain also requires a period of time in which to 
measure happiness, far many short-term pleasures can obviously produce
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a greater long-term pain.
Our search for an objective basis for a general happiness, how­
ever, cannot be limited to the identification of a single formula by 
which each individual might be happy. The presence of unhappiness in 
society is due to many factors, not all of which are rooted in social 
antagonisms. Because all happiness or sorrow is subjectively exper­
ienced, the most that such a theory oould offer are the social precon­
ditions necessary for the possibility of a general happiness.
As we have noted in the introduction, the question of human happi­
ness was first addressed by Marcuse in his essay, "On Hedonism". In 
it, he described two different versions of the hedonistic philosophy—  
the Cyrenaic and the Epicurean. Within the Cyrenaic school, the pur­
suit of happiness was secondary to the pursuit of particular plea­
sures. According to the exponents of that school, "Particular pleasure 
is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is not desirable for 
its own sake, but for the sake of particular pleasures."2
In addition, the Cyreniacs held that "bodily pleasures are far 
better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains are far worse than 
mental pains.”3 The only measure of happiness, therefore, was the 
individual's iirmediate perception of pleasure or pain.
In contrast to the Cyrenaics, the Epicureans adopted what Marcuse 
labeled a 'negative' hedonism. They were not so much interested in 
obtaining pleasure as they were in avoiding pain. For that reason, 
they "do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over 
many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. "4
For example, Epicurus led a spartan existence and often scoffed at
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the degenerate lifestyles of those who lived only for physical grati­
fication. He and his followers practiced moderation in all things and 
found the pleasures of the mind to be superior to those of the body.
Marcuse argued that both schools of hedonism developed in response 
to the slave economy in the ancient world and to the prevailing unhap­
piness which that economy produced. However, the hedonist schools fo­
cused their attention on the individual. Only individual pleasures or 
pains mattered, and the civic life was something to avoid. He found 
fault with hedonism precisely on that account. He noted that, "The 
particular interest of the individual, just as it is, is affirmed as 
the true interest and is justified against every and all comnuni- 
ty.... The concrete objectivity of happiness is a concept for which 
hedonism finds no evidence."5
According to Marcuse, the failure of hedonism did not lie in its 
demand for individual happiness in the face of social injustice, but 
in its inability to separate true from false interests. The pleasure 
which the master derived from the labor of the slave was quite real. 
However, the master-slave relationship was, nevertheless, the source 
of much unhappiness in the ancient world.
Any theory which uncritically endorses the pursuit of pleasure or 
the avoidance of pain as the only good will be unable to reconcile the 
interests of the individual with those of society. Plato had antici­
pated this critique of hedonism when he contended that the gratifi­
cation of 'bad' pleasures could undermine the social order.
One of the first formulations of the eudaemonistic position was 
put forth by Plato, who held that happiness necessarily involves
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knowledge. One must know the good in order to possess it. Because of 
the necessary connection between knowledge and happiness in Plato's 
philosophy, the quest for knowledge oould not be divorced from the 
pursuit of human happiness. This quest for knowledge has since char­
acterized the theoretical attitude of all science and philosophy.
For both Plato and Aristotle, theoria meant contemplation of the 
universe. Classical theory was related to life in that it sought to 
discover the paradigm of order in nature and man as a guide for prac­
tical action. Uiis connection between theory and practice resulted in 
the interest in ethical concerns far classical theory.
Because of this interest in eudaemonia, philosophers have, in 
various ways, attempted to explain the changing and contingent char­
acter of experience. Plato developed his theory of universals as an 
intellectual response to his uncertain knowledge of the phenomenal 
world. He reasoned that while individuals change, certain properties 
and ideas remain unchanged. Therecms of geometry, ideals of beauty, 
goodness and justice, and laws of nature all persist through change. 
Even the self recognizes itself as constant throughout life despite 
continual physical and mental changes.
This quest for knowledge led Plato to speculate on the existence 
of a realm of forms in which dwelled the ideal forms of which indi­
viduals are but imperfect copies. This realm of forms included such 
ideas as truth, goodness and beauty. In various dialogues, he express­
ed his understanding of the relationship between the forms of exis­
tence and the possibility of human happiness. For example, in the 
Symposium, Plato described a banquet at which a number of orators are
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asked to explain the nature of Love. The dialogue culminates with the 
speech of Socrates which expressed Plato's understanding of the rela­
tionship between beauty, time and happiness.
In this dialogue, Socrates relates the instruction he received 
from the wise Diotima of Mantineia. Diotima informed Socrates that 
Love is neither mortal nor immortal, good nor bad, beautiful nor ugly. 
Bom of Poverty and Plenty, Love is always striving after that which 
it lacks. However, men do not love the ugly or the bad because only 
possession of beauty and good things bring happiness. Because one who 
possesses perfect beauty or goodness would want it forever, the ulti­
mate object of Love is immortality. For finite creatures, a measure of 
immortality may be attained through the 'birth in beauty' of natural 
offspring as well as the products of the soul.
Finally, Socrates relates the instruction he received regarding 
the proper manner in which to grasp the essence of beauty. Diotima 
counseled that,
"he should love one body and there beget beautiful speech; 
then he should take notice that the beauty in one body is 
akin to the beauty in another body... .When he has learnt 
this, he must become the lover of all beautiful bodies.... 
Next he must believe beauty in souls to be mare precious 
than beauty in the body;. ..that he may moreover be compelled 
to contemplate the beauty in our pursuits and customs, and to 
see that all beauty is of one and the same kin....Next he 
must be led from practice to knowledge,...directing his gaze 
from now on towards beauty as a whole. ..and in contemplation 
of it give birth to many beautiful and magnificant speeches 
and thoughts in the abundance of philosophy."®
Diotima goes on to state that the nature of Beauty is everlast­
ing, neither increasing nor diminishing. While beautiful things are 
born and perish. Beauty remains unchanged. As such, it is both per-
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feet and inmortal.
For Plato, the Form of Beauty represented an integral aspect of 
the most general ground of being. The perfection and inrnartality of 
Beauty constitute mankind's highest aspiration, the promise of happi­
ness.
Plato's formulation of the nature of happiness deserves some 
scrutiny. He began by saying that Love is always striving after that 
which it lacks. We want what we do not have. The unhappy man will be 
happy only when he has achieved his aims or acquired what he wants. 
Conversely, the happy individual wants nothing which he does not have.
Men, however, do not love the ugly or the bad because only beauty 
and good things bring happiness. This statement appears at first to be 
tautological to the extent that the term 'good' may be defined as that 
which we desire. However, Plato's eudaemonism ruled out such a defin­
ition. Clearly, he believed that not all that we desire is good.
Plato also maintained that the possession of beauty is a primary 
source of happiness. Such a suggestion might appear odd, especially in 
light of the negative way poets and other artists are regarded in the 
Republic. However, his subsequent delineation between the beauty in 
the body and the beauty in the soul makes clear his preference for the 
"beautiful and magnificant speeches and thoughts in the abundance of 
philosophy."
Finally, Plato argued that inrnartality is the ultimate object of 
Love because one who posseses perfect beauty or goodness would want it 
forever. Because humans are mortal, however, only a measure of immor­
tality can be attained through the birth in beauty of natural off­
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spring or the products of the soul. Plato had philosophy in mind here, 
and certainly our reception of his works has provided him a measure of 
immortality.
Love of immortality characterizes a profound human concern for 
self-preservation in the face of death. The fear of death, or of loss 
in general, represents a significant obstacle to the pursuit of happi­
ness. The relationship between time and happiness, therefore, presents 
a central question in any study of the subject.
These observations from the Symposium raise many of the same is­
sues addressed by Marcuse in his exploration of the subject of human 
happiness. His turn to the aesthetic dimension concurs with Plato's 
emphasis on beauty as a source of happiness. In the rejection of he­
donism he found an anticipation of the subsequent attempt of Christian 
theologians and bourgeois moralists to justify a repressive morality. 
Finally, Marcuse's contention that the reality of death presents a 
final obstacle to the attainment of happiness is consistent with 
Plato's claim that inmartality is our ultimate aim.
The nature of happiness remains problematic. With his contention 
that happiness requires knowledge, Marcuse rejected the hedonist equa­
tion of pleasure and happiness. His critique of hedonism was based on 
the belief that individual satisfaction in the face of general misery 
was illusory. Instead, he argued that social justice formed the objec­
tive basis far a general happiness. But unlike Plato, Marcuse did not 
endeavor to depict the utopian society which reflected his ideal of 
justice. Instead, he confined his analysis to the actual conditions of 
capitalist society in order to examine the relationship between happi-
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ness and social justice. It is this relationship which guided the de­
velopment of his critical theory of society.
HAPPINESS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
The examination of the nature of happiness initiated in the pre­
vious chapter indicates a relationship between reason, happiness and 
social justice. For Plato and Aristotle the capacity to reason defined 
essential human nature. The ability to reason represents a unique 
power which separates human beings frcnt other animals. Reason gives 
form to experience. Only through the proper use of reason can men ar­
rive at a knowledge of the good. Such knowledge is essential if men 
are to live happy and virtuous lives. In this way the philosophical 
implies the practical and social.
For Plato, to know the good is to do it. Far Aristotle, happiness 
results from the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Both 
philosophers maintained that only the proper exercise of reason pro­
vided human beings with the knowledge necessary to live well. Both ex­
tolled virtue and rejected sensual pleasure as a reliable source of 
happiness.
The classicist preoccupation with reason as the expression of 
man's essential nature was taken up by Marcuse in his essay, "The 
Concept of Essence".-'- In this essay, he demonstrated that philosoph­
ical conceptions of human nature have been influenced historically by 
existing farms of social organization.
According to Marcuse, Plato and Aristotle understood human essence 
as potentiality in conflict with existence. Man's capacity to reason 
did not find expression in a rational social order. He observed that,
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"The Being of things is not exhausted in what they iirmediately are; 
they do not appear as they could be."2
The distinction between essence and appearance is crucial for any 
critical social theory. Marcuse stated that things do not appear as 
they could be. Existence does not coincide with essence. From Plato 
onward, idealist philosophy has never equated the truth of Being with 
mere appearance. Likewise, in Marcuse1 s critical theory the truth is 
defined not by the facts of social existence, but by the ideal possi­
bilities which have been repressed by the organization of society.
Marcuse also maintained that, "The essence as potentiality becomes 
a farce within existence. The concept of essence can beccme a 
force when it is used to criticize existence in light of its better 
possibilities. This same task was taken up by Plato in many of his 
dialogues.
In The Republic, far example, Plato used his description of the 
ideal state to criticize the Athenian society which had put Socrates 
to death. The principle which defines such a state is justice. In the 
dialogue, Plato maintained that the good of the individual could not 
be separated from the good of society as a whole. If justice is a pre­
condition for the general well-being of all citizens, Plato asked 
whether or not in all cases the just man is happy? He concluded that 
the just man is happy despite the sacrifices he might be required to 
make because he lives in a just society which provides for the good of 
its citizens.
The interest in social justice produced a tension within classical 
theory which could not be resolved within the context of the slave
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economy. However, despite this unresolved tension, classical theory 
reflected an accomodation to the social order.
According to Ifercuse, this accomodation was expressed in three 
ways. First, Aristotle's delineation of active and passive reason, 
with the latter reserved for the slave, reflected the prevailing order 
of domination and servitude. Second, his separation of practical from 
philosophical knowledge reinforced the belief that happiness is not to 
be found in this world. Finally, the other-worldly appeal of both the 
Platonic and Aristotelian world-views utilized reason as a means to 
repress the erotic and aggressive instincts at work within the human 
psyche.
Marcuse took issue with this tendency in classical philosophy to 
portray social contradictions as ontological conditions. The accep­
tance of slavery and other forms of social domination represented the 
retreat of critical reason in the face of an irrational social order. 
The very existence of slavery denied the possibility of happiness to 
the vast majority of individuals in the ancient world.
Marcuse also rejected Plato's utopian description of an 'ideal' 
society which bore little resemblance to the actual conditions of 
Greek life. Such a description did not provide the theoretical basis 
from which such a society might be established. In the end, Plato con­
cluded that justice would never be realized until philosophers became 
kings. Obviously, such an admission does not render the Republic a 
likely blueprint for social transformation.
Is individual happiness compatible with general misery? Is there 
such a state as 'false happiness'? Although it may be argued that
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happiness is strictly an individual concern, Marcuse, like Plato, 
maintained that true happiness was impossible without social justice. 
Only the creation of a just society could resolve the tension between 
essence and existence first expressed in classical philosophy. His 
critical theory of society was concerned, therefore, with the real 
conditions of existence which might lead to a general happiness. Con­
sequently, he branded as 'false' any expression of individual happi­
ness which did not concern itself with the happiness of other human 
beings.
According to Marcuse, "General happiness presupposes knowledge of 
the true interest: that the social life-process be administered in a 
manner which brings into harmony the freedom of individuals and the 
preservation of the whole on the basis of given objective historical 
and natural conditions.”4
As we have seen, it was Marcuse's contention that the appeal to 
reason present in classical philosophy co-existed with an irrational 
social order. The philosophical contemplation of truth, goodness and 
beauty did not provide for a general happiness. On the contrary, 
classical philosophy resigned itself to the fact that true happiness 
could not be found in this world.
This spirit of resignation grew deeper in the feudal period as 
Christian theologians used reason and religion to create an elaborate 
idea of the after-life. But unlike Plato's reconciliation of the ten­
sion between essence and existence as idealist or utopian philosophy, 
Christian theology pacified the tension with the idea of a loving God. 
This idea served to reduce social conflict while deferring the premise
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of happiness to the ' other world1.
Subsequently, in the bourgeois era, the philosopher Immanuel Kant 
also located the essence of man in his rational capabilities, but his 
conception of reason rested upon two distinct conceptions. He defined 
reason as both the unifying totality of the cognitive faculty and as 
"a single faculty that rises 'above' the understanding, as the faculty 
of those 'Ideas' that can never be represented in experience "5
Marcuse argued that it was only the latter conception of reason—  
that of a purely regulative function— which possessed any relation to 
freedom in Kant's philosophy. That freedom, of course, was internal. 
Freedom was understood as the ability of the subject to give to itself 
the universally necessary laws of reason. External to the individual 
was a world governed strictly by natural necessity. Consequently, the 
critical function of reason was restricted to the realm of morality as 
the only realm which could be determined in accordance with the rule 
of freedom.
Marcuse interpreted the appeal to reason expressed in the works of 
Kant as reflective of the nature of bourgeois society. The universal 
freedom proclaimed by that society masked the reality that the 'free' 
economic subjects were still controlled by the laws of the commodity 
market. The errphasis on duty and morality contained in these works 
.underscored the extent to which happiness within society was not some­
thing which should be expected. In fact, the pursuit of happiness was 
a subversive idea which found expression only in bourgeois art.
Marcuse asserted that because "the beauty of art is compatible 
with the bad present," bourgeois art was able to offer happiness in an
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illusory form. Bourgeois culture eternalized the beautiful moment 
which could be repeated again and again in the art work. He noted 
that, "there is an element of earthly delight in the works of great 
bourgeois art.... The individual enjoys beauty, goodness, splendor, 
peace and victorious joy. He even enjoys pain and suffering, cruelty 
and crime. He experiences liberation."® It is, however, only the 
liberation of the moment. Happiness is possible only in the aesthetic 
illusion.
The relationship between reason and happiness is a troubling one. 
Philosophers since Plato have argued that happiness is dependent upon 
the exercise of reason. However, the actual history of Western civil­
ization tends to refute the claim that the use of reason might bring 
about a general happiness. In fact, the application of reason to 
questions of social organization may actually prove to be a greater 
source of human unhappiness.
With the philosophers, Marcuse agreed that happiness requires 
knowledge; that it is more than the mere feeling of satisfaction. A 
general happiness, however, requires more than the exercise of reason. 
It requires the creation of a rational society which harmonizes 
individual freedom with the need to maintain social order. This task 
led Marcuse to writings of Karl Marx and to the theory of revolution.
From Idealism to Materialism
In contrast with the views expressed by such philosophers as 
Plato and Kant, the philosopher Karl Marx proposed a radically dif­
ferent interpretation of mankind's essential nature. He argued that 
the "essence of man is no abstraction inhering in each single indi-
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vidual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relation­
ships.
With this radical reorientation, Marx's Economic and Philosophi­
cal Manuscripts provided a philosophical basis for his critique of 
bourgeois political economy. His discussion of alienated labor came in 
response not only to questions raised by the philosopher Hegel, but to 
the entire tradition of idealist philosophy which had ignored the ac­
tual conditions of man's existence in its formulation of the concept 
of human happiness. In contrast to the many philosophers who had 
sought to explain the world, Marx sought to change it.
The discovery of Marx's materialist dialectic represented a major 
turning point in the development of Marcuse's critical theory. As a 
student at the University of Freiberg, he adopted much of the idealist 
and phenomenological orientation of his professor Martin Heidegger. In 
its place, Marx's historical materialism provided a methodology with 
which to analyze the actual conditions of man's existence.
Marcuse believed that the materialist dialectic proposed by Marx 
held great potential to indict existing society in light of its re­
pressed, but better possibilities. Although Hegel had described 
alienated labor as a negative reality, his idealistic formulation of 
the problem did not provide the basis far radical social change. For 
Marx, on the other hand, "the negativity of reality becomes a histor­
ical condition which cannot be hypostatized as a metaphysical state of 
affairs. In other words, it becomes a social condition, associated 
with a particular historical form of society."®
Marx argued that man is a sensuous being whose nature is confirmed
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by the products of his labor as a practical activity. As an objective, 
sensuous being, mankind's existence is characterized by neediness and 
distress. "Objects are thus not primarily objects of perception, but 
of needs, and as such objects of the powers, abilities and instincts 
of man."9
Marx's materialism found the confirmation of man's essential 
powers only in their objectification. Man does not simply accept the 
objective world, he must appropriate it by transforming objects into 
the organs of his life. According to Marx, each of man's "relations to 
the world— seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, ob­
serving, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving— in short, all the 
organs of his individual being...are in their orientation to the 
object, the appropriation of that object. "-*-0
Human freedom, according to Marx, involves the appropriation and 
transformation of objects in order to transcend what is given and pre- 
established. Through labor, man literally creates himself and his 
world. According to Marx, man creates "because he is posited by ob­
jects— because at bottom he is nature. In the act of self-crea­
tion, man regards himself as a universal and free being.
Furthermore for Marx, objective reality is also social and histor­
ical. He characterized the nature of social relationships in all pre­
viously existing societies as one of domination and servitude. Begin­
ning with the first division of labor, one class of human beings has 
always labored for another. As such, neither class can realize itself 
in its labor. In his day, the major social classes were the bour­
geoisie and the proletariat.
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Far Marx, the need for the abolition of class society was drawn 
directly from his analysis of alienated labor. He held that under cap­
italism, the laborer is alienated both from the product of his labor 
and from the labor process itself. Because the object which labor pro­
duces belongs not to the laborer but to another, it confronts the la­
borer as something alien. Consequently, his productive life appears 
only as a means to another end. In his Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts, Marx wrote,
"What constitutes the alienation of labour? First, that 
the work is external to the worker, that it is not part 
of his nature; and that, consequently, he does not ful­
fill himself in his work but denies himself, has a feel­
ing of misery rather than well-being, does not develop 
freely his mental and physical energies but is physically 
exhausted and martally debased. The worker, therefore, 
feels himself at heme only during his leisure time, where­
as at work he feels homeless. His work is not voluntary 
but inposed, forced labour. It is not the satisfaction of 
a need, but only a means for satisfying other needs. Its 
alien character is clearly shown by the fact that as soon 
as there is no physical or other compulsion it is avoided 
like the plague....Finally, the external character of work 
for the worker is shown by the fact that it is not his own 
work but work for someone else, that in work he does not be­
long to himself but to another p e r s o n ."12
According to Marx, the alienation of labor leads to other forms 
of alienation, including the alienation from nature, from other human 
beings, and from the species being which binds humans into community. 
For Marx, historical materialism represented a 'real humanism' which 
grasped the alienation of labor as a practical problem. Because he 
defined labor as man's essartial nature, Marx equated humanism with 
naturalism. The alienation of labor, therefore, calls into question 
the very nature of man.
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The implications of Marx's theory of alienation for the problem of 
human happiness are clear. First, Marx understood that the possibility 
of human happiness relied upon the actual state of social conditions. 
Since objective reality is social and historical, the present form of 
objective reality must be superseded before a new form can exist. 
Therefore, he called for a revolution of the proletariat as the only 
means by which a general happiness could be achieved.
Further, Marx maintained that communism represented the resolution 
of the tension between essence and existence which first appeared in 
classical philosophy. Under ccrtmunism there would be "the genuine res- 
olution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and 
man— the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, 
between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and 
necessity* between the individual and the species."13
While such a pronouncement appears incorrect in light of subse­
quent historical development, the abolition of alienated labor and 
class society became the object of Marcuse's critical theory. Writing 
in 1932 on the subject of Marx's Manuscripts, he proclaimed that, 
"Capitalism is characterized not merely by economic or political cri­
sis but by a catastrophe affecting the human essence... (which) re­
quires the catacylsmic transcendence of the actual situation through 
total revolution."14
In the initial formulations of his critical theory, Marcuse main­
tained that the realization of reason in society would mean the disap­
pearance of philosophy. He argued that materialism reversed the orien­
tation of all previous conceptions of man. In Marxism, "the idea of
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reason has been superseded by the idea of h a p p i n e s s . "  15
In contrast to traditional philosophy, Marcuse insisted that in 
his critical theory, "The philosophical construction of reason is 
replaced by the creation of a rational society."!^ His demand of 
reason required the creation of a social organization in which indi­
viduals could collectively regulate their lives in accordance with 
their needs. It was this emphasis on social revolution as the means to 
a general happiness which animated Marcuse's critical theory of 
society.
THE CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY
Herbert Marcuse developed his critical theory of society while a 
member of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. Established 
in 1923/ Institute members published both empirical and theoretical 
studies of the social/ economic, political, psychological and philo­
sophical issues of modem society. In 1937, Director Max Horkheixner 
coined the term 'critical theory1 to describe the common methodology 
employed by Institute members.^
Marcuse, came to the Frankfurt Institute from the University of 
Freiberg where he studied under the philosopher Martin Heidegger. 
German idealism and Heidegger's phenomenological approach both in­
fluenced the initial development of Marcuse's philosophy. As we have 
seen, his discovery of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
in 1932 radically shifted the focus of his study from questions of 
human authenticity to ones of social transformation.
Marcuse contended that in the materialist dialectic, reality is 
the totality of the relations of production. Its content is the main­
tenance and reproduction of society as a whole. Its form is the real­
ization of capital. This form, however, is only a particular histori­
cal pattern in which the content may be realized. He held that the 
existing content is reality in a 'bad' form.2
Nonetheless, while adopting Marx's materialist dialectic, Marcuse 
did not abandon the critical insights he found in idealist philosophy. 
His emerging critical theory sought instead to combine a critical ra-
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tionality with the historical analysis of man's social, economic and 
political existence in order to establish a framework in which the 
subject of human happiness could be explored.
Writing in the 1930's, Marcuse believed that the real potential­
ities for the fulfillment of human life were at hand. The relative 
success of capitalism in overcaning material scarcity had provided the 
level of economic development which Marx claimed was necessary for so­
cialist transformation. Marcuse believed that human fulfillment would 
be determined by such factors as the control of natural and social 
productive farces, the development of needs in relation to the possi­
bility of their satisfaction, and the availability and wealth of cul­
tural values.^
Above all, Marcuse believed that democratic social planning would 
enable the associated individuals to freely decide what was to be pro­
duced and how the wealth of society would be distributed. This empha­
sis on democracy and the autonomy of associated individuals character­
ized Marcuse's vision of the rational society. The purpose of his cri­
tical theory, therefore, was to explore the actual tendencies within 
capitalist society which could provide the basis for the realization 
of such a society.
The optimism of the 1930's soon gave way to horror, however, as 
the rise of fascism forced Marcuse and other Institute members to flee 
Germany for the United States. He later noted that his pre-Auschwitz 
writings were deeply separated from everything which was to follow. He 
observed that, "the concern with philosophy expressed in these essays 
was already, in the thirties, a concern with the past: remembrance of
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something that at seme point had lost its reality.... Precisely at 
that time, beaten or betrayed, the social forces in which freedom and 
revolution were joined were delivered over to the existing powers."4
The failure of proletarian revolution in Western Europe did not 
lead Marcuse to reject Marxism. It did, however, cause him to careful­
ly examine the existing powers which stood in the way of social revo­
lution. Obviously, the bourgeoisie as the dominant social class op­
posed the revolution. The rise of fascism, however, represented a 
development far more barbaric than mere class conflict. It more close­
ly resembled what Horkheimer and others later referred to as an 
'eclipse of reason'.
Marcuse's interest in the relationship between reason and happi­
ness led to the development of a critique of what he now termed the 
'philosophy of reason'. A primary focus of this critique dealt with 
the application of scientific reason to questions of social organiza­
tion. He argued that the relationship between reason and technology 
raised particularly serious issues which called into question the 
supposed rational self-interest of individuals.
Marcuse defined scientific rationality as that use of reason 
which, by quantifying nature, separates the true from the good, 
science from ethics. Universal ideas are refuted a priori by scien­
tific reason. They beccme "mere ideals, and their concrete content 
evaporates.
Scientific rationality proposes to remove the interest of the 
observing subject from the object of his study. But, according to 
Marcuse, the disinterestedness of science betrays its appropriation by
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the forces which control society. Because knowledge had always existed 
within a political context, the application of science to technology 
necessarily involves either an extension or a subversion of the 
existing political order.
For Marcuse, technology meant far mare than just the tools and 
methods of production. It was also a means of organizing social re­
lationships and projecting a world. Not only had technology permitted 
the conquest of nature, it had redefined our conception of nature. 
Thus, Marx's equation of humanism and naturalism had been replaced 
with the conception of nature as a mere object of utility.
Marcuse further contended that the farces which control society 
have used technology to bolster social domination. He held that when 
the domination of man is accomplished through the use of technology, 
scientific rationality becomes technological rationality. For Marcuse, 
technological rationality represented the constriction of reason to 
the needs of the technical apparatus. No longer is the fulfillment of 
human interests the ultimate purpose of reason. Rather, the rational 
is defined in terms of what serves the interest of the apparatus.
Marx had argued that the alienation of the laborer from the pro­
duct of his labor led to the fetishism of commodities in which a "def­
inite social relation between men., .assumes., .the fantastic form of a 
relation between things.The fetishism of ccmmodities conceals the 
true nature of capitalism as a system of domination and servitude.
In Marcuse's formulation the fetish of technique, or technical 
efficiency, had replaced commodity fetishism as the predominant form 
of mystification in the modem world.7 According to Marcuse, social
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organization as a whole reflects a technological a priori which de­
fines all social relationships in terms of technical efficiency. As a 
consequence, individuals develop a 'matter-of-fact' attitude which 
does not question the efficacy of technological rationality itself. 
While matter-of-factness itself was certainly not new, the social or­
ganization which it defined has changed considerably. Marcuse asserted 
that,
"Matter-of-factness animated ancient materialism and hedon­
ism, it was responsible in the struggle of modem physical 
science against spiritual oppression, and in the revolu­
tionary rationalism of the Enlightenment. The new attitude 
differs from ail these in the highly rational compliance 
which typifies it. The facts directing man's thought and 
action are not those of a nature which must be accepted in 
order to be mastered, or those of society which must be 
changed because they no longer correspond to human needs 
and potentialities. Rather are they those of the machine 
process, which itself appears the embodiment of rationality 
and expediency."8
Marcuse argued that the organization of modem society reflects a 
machine process which subordinates individual differences to a common 
framework of standardized performances. The pursuit of profit dic­
tates the quantity, form and kind of commodities which are produced 
and the skills of the individual laborer tend to be reduced to a ser­
ies of "semi-spontaneous reactions to prescribed mechanical norms."9 
This characterization of modem society as a machine process sug­
gests the extent to which Marcuse believed that we have lost sight of 
human happiness as the proper end of society. The pervasiveness of 
technological rationality masks the irrationality of contemporary life 
and blocks efforts to understand the source of our unhappiness.
The application of technological rationality within society finds
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perhaps its clearest expression in bureaucracy. Marcuse cited Weber's 
dictum that, "'In contrast to the democratic self-administration of 
small homogeneous units', bureacracy is 'the universal concordtant of 
modem mass democracy.' ”10 The development of bureaucratic organi­
zation is also the universal concord tant of the technical apparatus.
Bureacratization embodies the whole of the advanced capitalist and 
socialist world. It is central to both public and private organiza­
tion, to the ruling elite and to the official opposition. Bureacracies 
function hierarchically in order to regulate, control, enhance, and 
maintain the efficient utilization of resources— both human and 
natural— within a society defined by the economic performances of its 
members.
Although the bureaucratization of society is hardly synonomous 
with fascism, Marcuse did believe that technological rationality was 
cannon to both farms of organization. He argued that fascism repre­
sented an extreme form of bureacratic organization guided by techno­
logical rationality.
According to Marcuse, the reign of terror in National Socialist 
Germany was sustained not only by brute force but also by "the ingen­
ious manipulation of the power inherent in technology: the intensifi­
cation of labor, propaganda, the training of youths and workers, the 
organization of the governmental, industrial and party bureaucracy... 
follow the lines of greatest technological efficiency."-̂ -
Thus, technological rationality, unchecked by any overriding 
concern for the happiness of humanity, culminates in the authori­
tarian state. By equating reason with the needs of technical ef-
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ficiency, the farces which control the authoritarian state are capable 
of transforming the rational self-interest of individuals into compli­
ance with the demands of the state. In this manner, the connection be­
tween reason and happiness, the object of philosophy from the begin­
ning of Western civilization, is severed.
Marcuse did acknowledge that within a liberal democracy, economic 
farces cannot coirpel consumers to purchase their products. With the 
techniques developed from psychological and marketing studies, how­
ever, the loyalty of the consumer is elicited in a more subtle manner. 
Conformity is won with the appearance of freedom. Happiness has been 
replaced with the temporary gratification of manufactured needs.
In sum, this critique of technological rationality as a form of 
mystification and domination went to the heart of his concern for 
human happiness. Happiness involves knowledge; it requires the exer­
cise of human reason in a world free from fear, want and anxiety. The 
technical apparatus, however, has redefined human reason as technical 
efficiency. Man's creation has displaced the development of his essen­
tial capacities as the telos of life. Consequently, technology cannot 
deliver the happiness it promises because individual happiness is no 
longer the goal of reason. As long as man's reason is applied only to 
questions of technical efficiency, it is powerless to criticize and 
transcend existing social relationships.
However, while his rejection of technological rationality was 
unwavering, Marcuse's attitude toward technology itself was ambiva­
lent. He never renounced the possibility that mechanization could 
shift the focus of labor away from the necessities of production to an
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arena of free human realization. The reduction of scarcity and the 
abolition of competitive pursuits could provide the basis for greater 
social freedom. While it could not guarantee perennial happiness, it 
would mean a reduction in the alienation of labor, freedom from want, 
and a greater chance for the fullest development of human capabili­
ties.
The critique of technological rationality and the philosophy of 
reason fanned a cornerstone of Marcuse's critical theory of society.
He viewed the goal of technical efficiency as a dangerous challenge to 
the goal of social justice and human happiness. Furthermore, the 
failure of proletarian revolution and the rise of fascism strongly 
suggested to Marcuse that the problem of human happiness required a 
closer examination of the human psyche. It was at this point that he 
began his inquiry into Freud1 s metapsychology.
THE DEATH INSTINCT
In the preceeding chapter we discussed Marcuse's critique of tech­
nological rationality as an obstacle to social revolution and its im­
plied premise of human happiness. The fetishism of technical efficien­
cy provides an explanation for the separation of reason from the pur­
suit of happiness. However, the experience of fascism represented for 
Marcuse an even mere serious obstacle to the realization of a rational 
society. For fascism was possible only as a result of the acquiesence 
of a large segment of the working class. In his search far an explana­
tion of this behavior Marcuse turned his attention to the works of 
Freud.
Freud's metapsychology presented a serious challenge to the sup­
posed rationality of the human subject. Freudian theory reached to the 
care of Western conceptions of the self and constructed a system in 
which the interaction of instinctual forces could serve to explain 
human behavior.
Although several members of the Frankfurt Institute were deeply 
involved with Freud's work, Marcuse did not focus his attention on it 
until after 1940. Earlier work by Erich Fromm and Theodor Adorno cen­
tered on Freud's discussion of ideology and his theory of group behav­
ior. It was Freud's theory of instinctive behavior, however, which 
greatly interested Marcuse. Of particular concern to him was the pos­
tulate of a death instinct present in organic life since its origin.
Freud's theory developed gradually as a result of his clinical
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observations and his metapsychological speculations. He defined in­
stinct as "an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier 
state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon 
under the pressure of external disturbing forces."!
The 'earlier state of things' to which Freud referred was the 
inorganic state. His clinical observations led him to conclude that, 
"The dominating tendaicy of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life 
in general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove in­
ternal tension due to stimuli...and our recognition of that fact is 
one of our strongest reasons for believing in the existence of death 
instincts. "2
Freud's hypothesis of a death instinct was first proposed in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Patients' accounts of the repitition of 
traumatic dreams and painful behavior patterns led him to posit the 
existence of an instinct which opposed the pleasure principle. Freud 
proposed that a death instinct could explain the inclination to pain 
present in such experiences. The existence of sadomasochism also pro­
vided evidence of the fusion of sexual, aggressive and self -destruc­
tive instincts.
In addition to a death instinct, Freud also believed that the in­
clination to aggression represented "an original, self-subsisting in­
stinctual disposition in man (and) it constitutes the greatest imped­
iment to civilization."^ Because of man's innate aggressivess Freud 
believed that civilization was necessarily built upon the repression 
of the human instinctual constitution.
111 Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud traced the maturation of
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his instinct theory from its initial division of the ego and sexual 
instincts. With his hypothesis of narcissistic libido, the sexual in­
stinct was transformed into Eros, "which seeks to force together and 
hold together the portions of living substance.Sexuality desig­
nated that portion of Eros which is directed toward objects.
Freud speculated that Eros operates from the beginning of life as 
a 'life instinct1 in opposition to a "'death instinct' which was 
brought into being by the coming to life of inorganic substance. "5 
Freud wrote that his original characterization of the ego in­
stincts as separate from the sexual instincts was challenged by his 
realization that a portion of the ego instincts had a libidinal qual­
ity which took the subject's own ego as its object. "These narcissis­
tic self-preservative instincts had thenoe-fcrward to be counted among 
the libidinal sexual instincts."®
The distinction between the ego and sexual instincts was thus 
transformed into one between ego and object instincts, both of which 
were of a libidinal nature. Freud explained that at this point a new 
opposition emerged between the libidinal instincts and the instincts 
at work in destructive behavior. He referred to this opposition as one 
between the life instincts (Eros) and the death instincts (Thanatos).
The theory of the death instinct and man's natural aggressiveness 
were highly controversial features of Freud's metapsychology. Seme an­
alysts, such as Froirm, completely discounted this feature of Freud's 
work. Wilhelm Reich, on the other hand, argued vehemently that all 
forms of aggression could be reduced to repressed sexuality. His doc­
trine of social liberation emphasized the primacy of sexuality as a
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cure for aggressiveness.
Although Marcuse appropriated Freud's theory of a death instinct, 
his application of it remains somewhat obscure. In Eros and Civiliza­
tion, he argued that the ultimate goal of the instinct is pleasure and 
not death. "If the instinct's basic objective is not the termination 
of life but of pain— the absence of tension— then paradoxically, in 
terms of the instinct, the conflict between life and death is the more
ireduced, the closer life approximates the state of gratification.... 
Death would cease to be an instinctual goal.
Although Marcuse accepted the fact that the instincts were essen­
tially conservative, he rejected Freud's designation of them as large- 
ly immutable. Rather, he argued that the aggressiveness which Freud 
found to be innate in man represented no more than a depiction of the 
domination present historically within class societies. Accordingly, a - 
change in social organization could result in a historical modifica­
tion of man's instinctual constitution.
Marcuse also appropriated several other features of Freud's meta­
psychology which provided insights into human instinctive behavior, 
for one the Freudian division of the human psyche into id, ego and 
superego. With this division, Freud had atteirpted to explain the in­
teraction of instinctual and societal farces on the individual.
The id is the most archaic structure of the psyche. It is governed 
entirely by the pleasure principle, Freud's term for the urge which 
seeks a diminution of the quantity of excitation.®
The ego represents the self-conscious organization of the human 
personality. The existence of scarcity has led to the emergence of a
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reality principle which requires the ego to postpone or abandon many 
of the pleasures sought by the id in the interest of self-preserva­
tion.
The superego represents the structure of personality which incor­
porates society's demands on the individual. According to Freud, the 
need to establish and enforce order requires the repression of aggres­
sive tendencies in individuals. This introjection of aggresion pro­
duces conscience, the sense of guilt and the need for punishment.9 
The demands of the superego struggle against the urges of the id for 
control of the ego.
Freud noted that in the process of maturation our sense of ego 
changes significantly. For the infant "the ego includes everything, 
later it separates off an external world from itself. Our present ego- 
feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclu­
sive— indeed, an all-embracing— feeling which corresponded to a much 
more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it."-'-®
Freud called this feeling 'oceanic1 and referred to the impulse to 
return to such a state as the Nirvana principle. Marcuse speculated 
that, "Perhaps the taboo on incest was the first great protection 
against the death instinct: the taboo on Nirvana, on the regressive 
impulse for peace which stood in the way of progress, of Life it­
self."11
According to Freud's evolutionary theory, at the genesis of or­
ganic life is the realization that life is less 'satisfactory', or 
more painful than the preceeding inorganic stage. This awareness 
generates the death instinct as "the drive for relieving this tension
47
through regression. "12 Such a realization is often alluded to as the 
cause of birth trauma and of the desire of infants to return to the 
womb.
The next turning point in Freud's theory occurs with his analysis 
of the origin of civilization whereby the existence of scarcity farced 
the repressive control of the instincts. Freud speculated that the 
first human group was dominated by the father on the basis of his 
physical prowess. In this primal horde, the father monopolized the 
women while the instinctual energy of his sons was diverted to work. 
Eventually, their repression culminated in a rebellion in which they 
collectively killed aid devoured the father and established the 
brother clan.
There was an ambivalence in the brother's attitude toward their 
father, however. Their hatred was mixed with admiration and affection 
because the father provided the order necessary to maintain their 
group. Their collective guilt felt upon the destruction of this order 
led them to deify the father and to establish a sexual taboo enforced 
by the clan as a whole.13
Freud's general theory of social evolution was very much informed 
by the above speculation. He believed the presence of guilt to be cen­
tral to the subsequent development of civilization. Although this 
speculation is beyond the reaim of anthropolgical verification, it was 
accepted by Marcuse for its symbolic value. What is mare, he asserted 
that the alleged consequences of these events are historical facts.
* * * * *
The publication in 1955 of Eros and Civilization marked the first
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real attempt to.reconcile Freud's metapsychology/ especially the death 
instinct, with Marxism and the Western philosophical tradition. 
Although neither Marx nor the proletariat are even mentioned in the 
first edition of this work, the critical insights of Marxism were 
incorporated into Marcuse's general framework.
We must acknowledge that Marcuse's extrapolation has not been 
without its detractors. His adoption of Freud's metapsychological 
speculations has been criticized as unscientific. His use of psycho­
analytic terminology was at times imprecise and inconsistent. These 
objections notwithstanding, the thesis of this work is essential to 
any study of the question of human happiness. By reconciling the in­
sights of Marx and Freud, it was Marcuse's intention to demonstrate 
that a non-repressive civilization was theoretically possible.
Marcuse began his introduction to Eros and Civilization with the 
observation that, "Sigmund Freud's proposition that civilization is 
based on the permanent subjugation of the human instincts has been 
taken for granted. "I4 While adopting many of the speculations of 
Freud's metapsychology, Marcuse sought to overcome the apparent bio- 
logism of the Freudian system. It was his contention that tinder the 
'ideal' conditions of mature industrial society, it would be possible 
to gradually reduce the level of instinctual repression.
For Freud, the struggle for existence represented an eternal con­
dition of mankind. The presence of scarcity led to the emergence of a 
reality principle which repressed the instinctual demands of the id. 
Marcuse accepted the fact that "scarcity teaches men that they cannot 
freely gratify their instinctual impulses."15 what he rejected was
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the contortion that scarcity depicted the eternal fate of mankind.
The fact of material scarcity provides an explanation for the 
genesis of repression and domination. Material privation has led to 
the division of labor, class society and the repression of instinctual 
gratification. For Marcuse, however, the mere fact of scarcity did not 
prove the necessity of repression or domination. Anthropological stud­
ies, for example, have verified the existence of archaic societies 
which have been peaceful and egalitarian.
It was Marcuse's intention to demonstrate that at the attained 
level of mature industrial society, an order of abundance could 
eliminate the repression and dcmination enforced by past orders of 
scarcity. To accomplish this task he combined Marxian political 
economy with Freudian metapsychology in order to examine the social 
basis far instinctual liberation.
INSTINCTUAL LIBERATION
In the works that followed the publication of Eros and Civiliza­
tion, Marcuse developed his contention that the carder of domination 
promoted by scarcity could be abolished because of the success of sci­
ence and technology. In An Essay on Liberation, he argued that what is 
needed is "not the arrest or reduction of technical progress, but the 
elimination of those features which perpetuate man's subjection to the 
apparatus. "1 The emergence of new needs which capitalism cannot sat­
isfy would, accordingly, lead to the development of an essentially new 
science and technology.
The influence of Freudian theory persisted in Marcuse's analysis 
of capitalist society. In Eros and Civilization, he defined repression 
as "restraint, constraint and suppression."2 His usage of the term 
was not strictly psychoanlytic, however, and its meaning shifted in 
different contexts. 'Surplus repression' was defined as "the restric­
tions necessitated by social domination" as opposed to those of ratio­
nal authority. A particular group or individual may exercise domina­
tion "in order to sustain or enhance itself in a privileged posi­
tion."3
Similarly, Marcuse coined the term 'performance principle' to 
describe the prevailing historical form of the reality principle and 
with this term he argued that individuals are judged in this society 
by virtue of their competitive economic performances.4 Although 
couched in the language of psychoanalysis, his critique of domination
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was consistent with his Marxian analysis of class society.
Unlike Marx, however, Marcuse's indictment of social domination 
focused on the success of the capitalist system to assimilate its op­
ponents with the promise of an ever-increasing material standard of 
living. As early as 1941, Marcuse had argued that the proletariat no 
longer represented the determinate negation of society and that "the 
cooordinated masses do not crave a new social order but only a larger 
share in the prevailing one."5 Consequently, if the working class is 
to beccme radicalized, the catalysts of change must cone from outside 
its ranks.
As it developed in the 1960's, Marcuse's critique of advanced cap­
italist society was based on three points. First, the permanent pre­
paration for war necessitates the expenditure of huge sums of money 
for weapons of destruction which postpone the abolition of scarcity 
while eliminating any real sense of security.
Second, the level of capitalist development is uneven and has gen­
erated what is today referred to as a permanent underclass consisting 
of the dispossessed and unemployable outcasts of society. For these 
individuals the success of the system represents the very negation of 
their humanity.
Finally, the needs generated in capitalist society are 'false' be­
cause their satisfaction represses other 'higher' needs. Such higher 
needs would involve the intellectual and aesthetic aspirations of hu­
manity as well as the realization of solidarity with other human 
beings.
Although it is not possible to fully explore Marcuse's theory of
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needs, he did maintain that it was possible to objectively distinguish 
true from false needs. The ability to satisfy true human needs would 
coincide with the creation of a rational society which harmonizes the 
interests of individual freedom with those of social order. His thesis 
of a non-repressive civilization was predicated on the attainment of a 
social order in which the free expression of human drives and the sat­
isfaction of true human needs has eliminated the basis for aggressive­
ness.
Marcuse's thesis of a non-repressive civilization was called into 
question, however, by what Freud had described as the 'fatal dialectic 
of civilization'. This dialectic described the process by which the 
advances of society require ever greater repression which threatens, 
in turn, to unleash ever great destructiveness. If civilization does 
depend upon the permanent subjugation of the human instincts as Freud 
had asserted then any hope for instinctual liberation is illusory.
Although Marcuse acknowledged that cruelty and mass annihilation 
have increased along with the highest achievements of culture, he re­
fused to accept that claim that civilization is built upon instinctual 
repression. His search for a human faculty free from the repressive 
control of the prevailing reality principle led him to the imagina­
tion.
Pursuing Freud's contention that the imagination was the only hu­
man faculty still committed to the pursuit of pleasure, Marcuse noted 
the decisive function the imagination plays in the total mental struc­
ture. "It links the deepest layers of the unconscious with the highest 
products of consciousness (art), the dream with the reality; it pre­
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serves the archetypes of the genus, the perpetual but repressed ideas 
of the collective and individual memory, the tabooed images of free­
dom. 6
But, despite the critical role which Marcuse assigned to the imag­
ination, he also acknowledged its subservience to the reality princi­
ple. According to Marcuse, when the reality principle takes root, 
"reason prevails: it becomes unpleasant but useful and correct; phan­
tasy remains pleasant but becomes useless, untrue— a mere play, day 
dreaming. "7
Nevertheless, the role of the imagination remains essential to any 
possible reconciliation of reason and happiness. The imagination rein­
vigor ate s the tension between existence and essence, between the ac­
tual and the possible. According to Marcuse, the cognitive function of 
the imagination reveals the aesthetic form as the actual expression of 
the pleasure principle. He asserted that, "Behind the aesthetic form 
lies the repressed harmony of sensuousness and reason— the eternal 
protest against the organization of life by the logic of domination, 
the critique of the performance principle."®
This critique of the performance principle was based on his claim 
that the order of abundance achieved in the advanced industrial na­
tions had created "transcending needs which cannot be satisfied with­
out abolishing the capitalist mode of production. "9 The satisfaction 
of these new needs would replace the performance principle with an 
aesthetic ethos as the new reality principle.
As he developed the critique, Marcuse envisioned a new sensibility 
which would affirm the "ascent of the life instincts over aggressive­
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ness and guilt" by creating "a vital need for the abolition of injus­
tice and misery. This sensibility would be guided by the imagin­
ation and technique would tend toward art. The sensuous, the playful, 
the calm and the beautiful characterized the aesthetic ethos which 
Marcuse believed would replace the prevailing performance principle.
Marcuse's concern far the development of a new sensibility also 
led him him to re-examine the possible role of human sexuality in his 
aesthetic ethos. Sexuality as a farm of play was central to Marcuse's 
critical theory. While Freud had pointed to the fusion of the sex in­
stincts with aggressiveness as one explanation for society's hostility 
toward sexuality, Marcuse maintained that "the sex instincts bear the 
brunt of the reality principle. Their organization culminates in the 
subjection of the partial sex instincts to the primacy of genitality, 
and in their subjugation under the function of procreation."H
Marcuse's rejection of genitality stemmed from what he saw as the 
resultant desexualization of the remainder of the body. In place of 
genitality, he advocated pregenital polymorphus perversity which would 
eroticize the entire personality. He believed that the perversions up­
held "sexuality as an end in itself.. .against the subjugation of sexu­
ality under the order of procreation, and against the institutions 
which guarantee this o r d e r ."12
Marcuse's elevation of the perversions, or partial sex instincts, 
was an extremely controversial feature of his call far instinctual 
liberation. Although rejected by Marxists and Freudians alike, Marcuse 
maintained that genital sexuality reinforced the repressive institu­
tions of society by linking sexuality to procreation and the patri-
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archal family. While this criticism was perhaps overly broad, it did 
underscore his conviction that Eros must not be confined to procre­
ation.
Marcuse's call far instinctual liberation also included the ex­
tension of libidinal relations into all areas of life including the 
order of work. Although Freud recognized the libidinal character of 
work relations, he held that aim-inhibited sexuality was still a form 
of instinctual repression. Marcuse, on the other hand, believed that 
the extension of libidinal relations into the order of work would make 
work "gratifying in itself without losing its work content. "13 He 
contended that work as play could not be subject to any administra­
tion.
Marcuse held that the extension of libidinal relations into the 
order of work could actually create a realm of freedom through work 
activity. He remarked that, "The social expression of the liberated 
work instinct is cooperation which, grounded in solidarity, directs 
the organization of the realm of necessity and the development of the 
realm of freedom."!4
The idea of work as play may have been the most utopian of Mar­
cuse's conceptions. It was never really thematized after Eros and 
Civilization and its realization would appear to rest upon the aboli­
tion of the realm of necessity. As long as scarcity and competition 
define the world of work it is hard to imagine anything but the most 
creative of pursuits as gratifying in itself.
In addition to its implications for aesthetics and sexuality, 
Marcuse's conception of instinctual liberation also envisioned the
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reconciliation of man and nature. In his search for a new cultural 
model he turned to Greek mythology and the figures of Narcissus and 
Orpheus. He observed that, "Theirs is the image of joy and fulfill­
ment... the redemption of pleasure, the half of time, the absorption of 
death; silence, sleep, night, paradise."I5
In these myths the harmony of man and nature is restored. "In 
being spoken to, loved, and cared for, flowers and springs and animals 
appear as what they are— beautiful, not only for those who address and 
regard them, but for themselves, objectively."
Marcuse's depiction of man's reconciliation with the natural world 
challenged the necessity of the performance principle. His new sensi­
bility expressed the ascent of Eros, or the life instincts, over the 
aggressive and self-destructive instincts. It envisioned human soli­
darity, environmental harmony, the preservation of joy, and the aboli­
tion of alienation, want and privation.
Marcuse's conception of a new sensibility also called for a new 
relationship with nature which would be free from domination and all 
ideas of utility. The idea of 1 letting-be' or surrender characterized 
an essentially passive or receptive relationship to the natural world. 
At the same time, however, he acknowledged that receptivity meets the 
resistance of matter in that "nature is not a manifestation of 
'spirit', but rather its essential limit."17
This acknowledgement of the limits of receptivity may also be ap­
plied to the entire conception of instinctual liberation. While Mar­
cuse's call for a new science and a new technology might redefine 
man's relation to nature, it could not eliminate all ideas of utility.
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Likewise, even his most optimistic vision of instinctual liberation 
was conditioned by his acceptance of death as the ultimate barrier to 
lasting gratification.
111 Eros and Civilization, Marcuse concluded that, "The brute fact 
of death denies once and far all the reality of a non-repressive exis­
tence.. ..Timelessness is the ideal of pleasure....But the ego... is in 
its entirety subject to time....The flux of time helps men to forget 
what was and what can be: it makes them oblivious to the better past 
and the better future.
Against the surrender to time, he proposed "the restoration of 
remembrance to its rights, as a vehicle of liberation...."^
Marcuse's emphasis on remembrance, however, was not meant to invoke 
any golden past or even the innocence of youth. Instead, he claimed 
that it represented the attempt to reassemble the fragments of joy and 
truth which can be found in a distorted humanity and a distorted na­
ture. For Marcuse, the expression of that repressed truth was confined 
to authentic works of art. It was, therefore, to the aesthetic dimen­
sion and the idea of Beauty that he returned in his inquiry into the 
possibility of human happiness.
THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION
The relationship between beauty and happiness was a central theme 
in Marcuse's critical theory from its inception. While a member of the 
Frankfurt Institute, he analyzed the 'beautiful illusion' present in 
bourgeois art. In Eros and Civilization, he linked aesthetic form to 
the pursuit of pleasure which has been repressed by the performance 
principle. In One-Dimensional Man, he appropriated Whitehead's defin­
ition of art as the determinate negation of society, thereby replacing 
Marx's proletariat as the primary source of opposition.!
The development of Marcuse's aesthetic ethos was influenced con­
siderably by the aesthetic theories of Irrmanual Kant and Friedrich 
Schiller. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant described aesthetic 
judgment as the 'middle term' between reason and the understanding.
He held that contemplation of beautiful objects stimulated the harmon­
ious interplay of the understanding and the imagination. Beauty was 
designated as 'purposiveness without purpose'. Just as truth was the 
object of theoretical reason and goodness the object of practical 
reason, beauty was the object of aesthetic judgment. Like truth and 
goodness, beauty was for Kant a symbolic representation of freedcm.2
Turning to Schiller, Marcuse observed that, "Only because beauty 
is a necessary condition of humanity can the aesthetic function play a 
decisive role in reshaping civilization....In a truly free civiliza­
tion, all laws are self-given by the individuals: 'to give freedom by 
freedom is the universal law' of the aesthetic state...."2
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In contrast to the predominant thought of the bourgeois period, 
Schiller introduced the concept of the play inpulse as an alternative 
to toil. Its object was beauty, its goal freedom. Marcuse argued that, 
"In a genuinely humane civilization, the .human existence will be play 
rather than toil, and man will live in display rather than need."4
But since time is the fatal enemy of lasting gratification, 
Schiller attributed to the play impulse the function of " 'abolishing 
time in time', of reconciling being and becoming; change and iden­
tity. ' Schiller's call for the timeless possession of beauty 
echoed the instruction which Socrates received from Diotima. All love 
is ultimately love of immortality.
In works such as An Essay on Liberation, Counter-Revolution and 
Revolt and The Aesthetic Dimension, the relationship between beauty 
and the possibility of happiness was increasingly thematized. In these 
works, Marcuse asserted that radical social change depended upon the 
emergence of a new aesthetic sensibility. He held that, "radical 
change in consciousness is the beginning, the first step in changing 
gocial existence: emergence of the new Subject."6
The new sensibility which Marcuse advocated required a new lan­
guage and a new mode of perceiving the world. In order to project a 
sensibility free from all forms of domination, he turned to poetry and 
surrealism as aethethic forms which could "dissolve the very structure 
of perception.
This emphasis on aesthetic form, as opposed to the content of the 
art work, placed Marcuse outside of the mainstream of Marxist aesthet­
ics . In The Aesthetic Dimension, he flatly rejected the claim that the
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authenticity of a work of art is directly related to its political 
content. Instead, he argued that, "The fact that a work truly repre­
sents the interests or the outlook of the proletariat or of the bour­
geoisie does not yet make it an authentic work of art. "8
For Marcuse, the truth of an art work is measured by its content 
having becone form. Aesthetic form is defined by those qualities which 
make a work a self-contained whole with a structure and order of its 
own. Aesthetic form transforms reality into illusion and in so doing 
affirms its commitment to Beauty as the ultimate truth of all art.
Marcuse criticized Marxist aesthetics for ignoring the idea of 
Beauty in its enphasis on the political content of the art work. He 
insisted that although the Greek tragedy or the medieval epic, for ex­
ample, have nothing to do with the interests of the proletariat, we 
nevertheless experience them as authentic works. He maintained that 
because such works convey a truth about the human condition they are 
authentic irregardless of the political outlook of the author.
While writers such as Sartre and Brecht insisted that revolution­
ary art must speak the language of the people, Marcuse contended that 
it may be necessary to stand against the people in order to bring 
about the necessary rupture with existing society. He argued that, 
"Revolutionary art may well become 'The Enemy of the People,'” in its 
insistence on a sensibility and social organization which 'the people' 
do not want.^
Marcuse suggested that there may be more revolutionary potential 
in the poetry of Baudelaire or Rimbaud than in the didactic plays of 
Brecht. In fact, he even argued that, "Art can express its radical
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potential only as art....Art cannot represent the revolution, it can 
only invoke it in another medium."10 For Marcuse, the necessity of 
revolution is given a priori in the authentic work. To make "the Revo­
lution' thematic as proposed by the advocates of socialist realism 
only threatens to reduce authetic art to a form of propaganda.
The revolutionary character of authentic art was confirmed far 
Marcuse by the fact that art, by its very commitment to beauty, in­
dicts existing society. The indictment estranges its audience from 
their everyday lives without offering any siirple, practical means of 
reforming their lives. In Beckett's plays, for example, no hope is 
offered in the political sense, only the message that existing reality 
must come to an end. Likewise, Kafka's prose shatters the reasonable­
ness of the established order.
Marcuse argued that, "The indictment is just as much in the sen­
suous, emotional language of Vferther and the Fleurs du Mai as it is in 
the hardness of Stendahl and Kafka. "H Art is able to indict reality 
precisely because it is unreal. As illusion, art can freely portray 
th= unfreedom of individuals in an unfree society.
The commitment of art to aesthetic form, however, also weakens the 
indictment contained in the authentic work. According to Marcuse, "The 
very commitment of art to.form vitiates the negation of unfreedom in 
art....The form of the work of art invests the content with qualities 
of enjoyment...."12 This enjoyment derives from the beautiful illu­
sion which the work presents. The resulting catharsis reduces the 
sense of estrangement and the need to change reality.
Marcuse asserted that, "Art is powerless against this reconcilia-
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tion with the irreconcilable; it is inherent in the aesthetic form 
itself ....Thus even the prison scene in Eaust is beautiful, as is the 
lucid madness in Buchner's Lenz, Therese's story of the death of her 
mother in Kafka's Amerika and Beckett's Endgame."15
Despite this self-limitation, Marcuse held that the idea of Beauty 
remains subversive of the existing order and offers the most powerful 
alternative to this order. Art is carmitted to Eros in its fight 
against social and instinctual repression. According to Marcuse, "Art 
represents the ultimate goal of all revolutions: the freedom and hap­
piness of the individual. m1^
Marcuse maintained that the commitment to aesthetic form guaran­
tees the autonomy of art vis a vis social reality. While social con­
ditions are always present in the work of art, even if only as back­
ground or horizon, the work must transcend the given social relations 
in its creation of a fictitious world.
Marcuse rejected attempts to abandon aesthetic form in favor of a 
direct depiction of reality because in such depictions art loses its 
critical distance from its subject. "Renunciation of the aesthetic 
form does not cancel the difference between art and life— but it does 
cancel that between essence and appearance, in which the truth of art 
has its home and which determines the political value of art."15
The collapse of essence into appearance would represent the end of 
art and tie end of critical theory. Marcuse held that such phenomena 
as the 'living theater’, 'cinema verite' or the artistic composition 
of the soup can amounted to 'anti-art'. By abandoning aesthetic form, 
such works become "the bits and pieces of the very society..." they
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seek to criticize.^ Despite the self-limitation of the aesthetic 
form, Marcuse maintained that only in the idea of Beauty is preserved 
the possibility of happiness and liberation.
The relationship between aesthetic form and revolution was some­
what ambiguous in Marcuse's critical theory. He rejected the identifi­
cation of aesthetic form with political tendency as proposed by anoth­
er member of the Frankfurt Institute, Walter Benjamin. Instead, he 
sided with Theodor Adorno in his debate with Benjamin over the import­
ance of autonomous works of art. Because he believed that authentic
r
art was the determinate negation of existing society, Marcuse held 
that authentic works must not uphold any particular social group or 
political party as the revolutionary vanguard.
Marcuse argued that although art cannot change the world, "it can 
contribute to changing the consciousness and drives of the men and wo­
men who could change the world."1? At present, these men and women 
belong to no particular social class, but rather constitute those in­
dividuals for wham revolution has become a vital need.
This emphasis on needs and saisibilities resulted from Marcuse' s 
conviction that the proletariat no longer represented the determinate 
negation of society. In an atteirpt to identify the possible catalysts 
of revolutionary change, he turned his attention to various outgroups 
such as students, women, the poor and third world minorities. In the 
end, however, he concluded that the subject to which authentic art 
might appeal "is socially anonymous; it does not coincide with the 
potential subject of revolutionary practice.
Marcuse insisted that what is needed is a new system of aesthetic
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and intellectual needs which are free from the repressive power of the 
performance principle. If social revolution is to take place, he held 
that it will be necessary to first change the consciousnesses and 
drives of the men and women who could change the world. According to 
Marcuse, such a change in consciousness is possible only because the 
unreality of the work of art permits it to freely contradict the un- 
free reality of existing society.
For Marcuse, the power of art to transcend reality makes the con­
flict between art and social practice inevitable. If absolute freedcm 
and justice is impossible within society, then authentic art must al­
ways criticize social practice. He argued that "the 'end of art1 is 
conceivable only if men are no longer capable of distinguishing be­
tween true and false, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, present and 
future.Such a prospect would not represent a state of freedom, 
but a state of barbarism.
The inherent limits to social freedom are plainly stated in The 
aesthetic Dimension. "The institutions of a socialist society, even in 
their most democratic form, could never resolve all the conflicts be­
tween the universal and the particular, between human beings and na­
ture, between individual and individual. It is the struggle for the 
impossible, against the inoonquerable whose domain can perhaps never­
theless be reduced."20 This profoundly anti-utopian conclusion 
stands in stark contrast to the optimistic prospects outlined in Eros 
and Civilization.
Despite the profound change in outlook, there is a common theme 
which unites these works. In both works, the role of memory is central
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to the artistic mimesis which, in turn, directly affects the possibil­
ity of happiness. In The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse observed that, 
"Art cannot show the present without showing it as past....The mimesis 
translates reality into memory. In this remembrance, art has recog­
nized what is and what could be, within and beyond the social condi­
tions."
In Eros and Civilization, he contended that, "The lost paradises 
are the only true ones not because, in retrospect, the past joy seems 
mare beautiful than it really was, but because remembrance alone pro­
vides the joy without anxiety over its passing and thus gives it an 
otherwise impossible duration. Time loses its power when remembrance 
redeems the past. "22
The anxiety over the passing of joy goes to the heart of the 
question of human happiness. If joy must pass with time, then lasting 
happiness is impossible. But if the delight of the past moment can be 
relived again and again in memory or in the work of art, at least same 
measure of happiness may be secured. Only the reality of death as the 
destruction of memory brings to an end the premise of lasting gratifi­
cation.
Marcuse's response to the inevitability of death was surprising.
111 Etcs and Civilization, he remarked that, "The necessity of death 
does not refute the possibility of final liberation. Like the other 
possibilities, it can be made rational— painless. Men can die without 
anxiety if they know that what they love is protected from misery and 
oblivion." 23
It appears as if Marcuse had not fully reconciled himself to the
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finality of death in this passage. His prescription for a painless 
death seems out of place with the fact that it is impossible to com­
pletely protect what one loves from misery and oblivion— particularly 
from beyond the grave.
In The Aesthetic Dimension, however, the tone is decidedly more 
pessimistic. Even the power of remembrance to redeem the past seems 
almost illusory. Marcuse wrote that, "While art bears witness to the 
necessity of liberation, it also testifies to its limits. What has 
been done cannot be undone; what has passed cannot be recaptured. His­
tory is guilt but not redemption. Eros and Thanatos are lovers as well 
as adversaries... .The world was not made for the sake of the human 
being and it has not become more human. "24
He further pointed out that it is difficult to imagine any society 
which could abolish what is called fate or chance. He maintained that 
art "bears witness to the truth of dialectical materialism— the per­
manent non-identity between subject and object, individual and indi­
vidual. "25 Consequently, even the rational society projected by 
critical theory could not guarantee the general happiness which 
Marcuse sought.
Finally, he asserted that death represents "a constant hazard, 
misfortune, a constant threat even in moments of happiness, triumph, 
fulfillment....death retains the negation inherent in society, in 
history. "26
Despite the gloominess which these conclusions reveal, Marcuse did 
not abandon his inquiry into the possibility of human happiness. While 
he acknowledged that "tragedy is always and everywhere...", he also
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maintained that "this insight, inexorably expressed in art, may well 
shatter faith in progress but it may also keep alive another image and 
another goal of praxis, namely the reconstruction of society and na­
ture under the principle of increasing the human potential for hap­
piness. The revolution is for the sake of life, not death. "27
Marcuse maintained that happiness involves knowledge, that it is 
the prerogative of the animal rationale. Happiness is not to be found 
in the mere feeling of satisfaction, however, but in the reality of 
freedom and satisfaction. Although death represents a final barrier to 
lasting happiness, Marcuse did not abandon revolution and the pursuit 
of social justice as the means to increase the potential for human 
happiness. In The Aesthetic Dimension he concluded that, "If the re­
membrance of things past would beocme a motive power in the struggle 
for changing the world, the struggle would be waged for a revolution 
hitherto suppressed in the previous historical revolutions."28
What this revolution would be like and what type of society it 
might produce remains to be seen. For Marcuse, the power of reason and 
memory to comprehend and project a better world provided the basis for 
his critical theory of society. It is our endowment as rational and 
sensuous beings which makes it possible far us to transcend our pre­
sent conditions by appreciating our past. As Marx observed, the philo­
sophers have interpreted the world, in various ways, the goal is still 
to change it.
TIME AND HAPPINESS
While happiness has been acknowledged by philosophers to represent 
an end in itself, the means to that end vary radically. The social 
conditions which Marcuse charted as necessary pre-conditions for the 
possibility of happiness— an order of abundance, democratic planning 
and social justice— remain the task of political praxis. At the same 
time, he also recognized that death and human imperfection presented 
ultimate barriers to lasting happiness.
Plato understood that men do not only want to possess good things, 
but that they want to possess them forever. The impossibility of 
satisfying this desire, however, led to the birth of theory as the 
attempt to understand the world in order to overcome suffering and 
death.
The Western response to suffering and the necessity of death has 
been diverse. The religious tradition has tended to deny the reality 
of death by offering the promise of eternal life. The secular tra­
dition, in the extreme, has emphasized material satisfaction because 
of the inevitability of death. Unfortunately, the pursuit of earthly 
riches within a context of scarcity has led to domination and ex­
ploitation. Slavery and servitude, discrimination, poverty and in­
justice are mare than the results of natural necessity. They are also 
the products of the spirit of capitalism, which in its pursuit of 
worldly gain has subjected the less fortunate to worldly misery.
There is, however, another path to human happiness. Marcuse's
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critical theory adopted the insights of hedonism and eudaemonism, 
Marxian political economy and Freudian metapsychology in order to 
establish the necessary preconditions for the realization of a general 
happiness. His enphasis on material abundance, social justice and 
instinctual liberation provides a theoretical basis for the creation 
of a rational society. The possibility of lasting happiness, however, 
remains problematic.
Marcuse maintained that happiness requires knowledge. If, however, 
knowledge of the truth of existence is tragic, how can happiness be 
secured? In response to this dilemma, Schiller introduced the concept 
of the play impulse as a means of abolishing time in tine. Likewise, 
Nietzsche's myth of the eternal return sought to break the domination 
of time over life. The poetic and the mystical conceptions of life 
have proclaimed the momentary identity of subject and object as the 
ultimate truth of existence. Bourgeois art also offered the momentary 
happiness of the beautiful illusion which could be experienced again 
and again.
The question of happiness appears to be inseparable from the 
question of time. Anxiety over the passage of time robs us of the 
possibility of happiness. Pear and anxiety emerge in relation to a 
future possibility which threatens to destroy what we love. Want, as 
the consciousness of deprivation, relates the unsatisfactory present 
to a possibly better future. Freedom from fear, anxiety and want not 
only would require social justice and an order of abundance, but also 
would require the abolition of time in time— an accomplishment which 
no society can Insure.
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Obviously, the question of happiness must not be reduced to one of 
the transcendence of consciousness. Freedom for the fullest possible 
development of human capabilities and sensibilities requires that we 
attend to the pursuit of human solidarity and a just social order.
The spiritual and the materialist conceptions of life must somehow 
be reconciled. While religious conceptions may be unscientific, what 
science can explain the origin of life? The mystery of life may ulti­
mately invalidate the certainty of all science and philosophy.
While the poetic experience of time may not resolve the question 
of happiness, it does speak to the central issues at stake. In his 
poem, "Song of Myself," Walt Whitman reflected on his belief in the 
cycles of life and death which affirm rather than negate the possi­
bility of lasting happiness.
The clock indicates the moment— but what does eternity indicate?
We have thus far exhausted trillions of winters and summers,
There are trillions ahead, and trillions ahead of them.
Births have brought us richness and variety.
And other births will bring us richness and variety....
And I say to mankind, Be not curious about God,
For I who am curious about each am not curious about God,
(No array of terms can say how much I am at peace about God 
and about death.)
I hear and behold God in every object, yet understand God not 
in the least,....
And as to you Death, and you bitter hug of mortality, it is idle 
to try to alarm me....
And as to you Life I reckon you are the leavings of many deaths,
(No doubt I have died myself ten thousand times before.)...
There is that in me— I do not know what it is— but I know it is 
in me....
It is not chaos or death— it is form, union, plan— it is eternal 
life— it is Happiness.1
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While the truth of poetic expression is at most suggestive, we 
have seen that Marcuse maintained that there is an intimate connection 
between the truth of art and the possibility of happiness. He also 
spoke of aesthetic sensibility as rational and moral. His conception 
of reason and morality, however, was linked to human sensuousness as a 
practical concern. Consequently, the creation of aesthetic sensibility 
and the pursuit of social justice became comnon goals of his critical 
theory.
For Marcuse, critical rationality is completely carmitted to the 
realization of a society in which human beings could freely satisfy 
their needs in accordance with their reason. His critique of techno­
logical rationality did not reject technology, but the mentality which 
comprehends the end of life only in terms of technical efficiency. He 
opposed the rational organization of modem society precisely on the 
basis of its efficiency.
What is to be done? The truth of art is also the truth of critical 
reason— to call things what they are, not to imitate but to comprehend 
life. The task of political praxis has not changed since Marx— it is 
still our task to change the world. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse 
outlined the criteria which he believed must be invoked to justify any 
call far a new social order.
"(1) The transcendent project must be in accordance with the 
real possibilities open at the attained level of the material 
and intellectual culture.
(2) The transcendent project, in order to falsify the estab­
lished totality, must demonstrate its own higher rationality in 
the threefold sense that
(a) it offers the prospect of preserving and improving 
the productive achievements of civilization;
(b) it defines the established totality in its very 
structure, basic tendencies, and relations;
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(c) its realization offers a greater chance for the 
pacification of existence, within the framework 
of institutions which offer a greater chance for 
the free development of human needs and faculties."2
In the face of a political system dominated by a military techno­
cracy which threatens the very survival of humanity, the possibility 
of human happiness depends upon the success of political praxis. What 
is needed is the courage and organization to bring about those re­
forms which will reduce the international tensions and in justices 
which have brought us to the brink of annihilation.
Human survival is the first priority. Only a human species can re­
produce the social order necessary for individual happiness. Survival 
requires the end of the nuclear arms race and a general reduction in 
armaments and violence throughout the world. It may also require the 
abolition of the nation-state as the predominant form of political 
organization. In its place, a new international order must be estab­
lished which can administer justice without recourse to warfare.
Survival also requires the abolition of hunger, disease and all 
farms of want and privation. Only an order of abundance is consistent 
with freedom. The conquest of scarcity remains the great unfinished 
project of mankind, the completion of which is greatly hindered by the 
presence of political elites and authoritarian regimes. A conversion 
of economic resources now cormitted to warfare, however, would go far 
in the effort to provide for the general welfare.
Survival means the protection and enhancement of the natural world 
as the environment in which we live. The physical and psychological 
health of human beings is directly related to the preservation of 
nature. The beauty and grandeur of open spaces is a source of human
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creativity which, if lost, would destroy the possibility of happiness.
Finally, survival means solidarity with all members of the human 
species. Errpathy for the plight of others can help to alleviate the 
unnatural misery which social domination new enforces. Human solidar­
ity may also reconcile men and women to the fact that the suffering 
which cannot be alleviated may at least be endured.
The transcendent project which Marcuse envisioned would also 
entail a new science and a new technology. While the scientific 
enterprise would not necessarily change, the direction and application 
of scientific research would create new facts and new possibilties. 
Technology as the tools and methods to feed the hungry is an essen­
tially different project than the technology utilized to build a 
space-based weapons system. A rational use of technology must respond 
to a human reason which pursues human goals rather than technical 
efficiency or profit maximization.
The powers which restrict and deform humanity are also human 
powers which can, therefore, be confronted and transformed. The re­
strictions inposed by natural necessity, on the other hand, can be 
reduced, but never eliminated.
Might not human beings one day achieve iimiortality through techni­
cal means? Even if the human lifespan could be extended indefinitely, 
the lack of human perfection would, of itself, guarantee sorrow. Per­
fection, on the other hand, would halt the passage of time. It would 
capture in a moment the identity of subject and object, the unity of 
self and world as the source of life and as the guarantee of lasting 
happiness.
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Marcuse's preoccupation with human happiness represents a peren­
nial concern of philosophy. The original impulse of philosophy was to­
ward the 'other world' as the hope for a happiness which society and 
material existence denied. What the two-world theory failed to acknow­
ledge, however, was the fact that the other world cannot exist apart 
from this world. The other reality exists within this reality, even if
it is accessible only in memory or in the beautiful illusion of the
aesthetic dimension.
If happiness exists only in the moment, then it would be incorrect 
to assert that even the most rational society could insure a general 
happiness. Par every society is subject to time and time is the nega­
tion of happiness. No momentary satisfaction may cancel the future or 
the inevitable path to death.
Although social change cannot insure human happiness, neither can 
it be ignored. The attempt to transcend reality through art will ulti­
mately fail because aesthetic transcendence is illusory. While the 
aesthetic experience can become a factor in the struggle for greater 
freedom, justice and solidarity, it cannot replace the need for poli­
tical praxis.
In the end, there is no other world than the one which is shared 
by all of humanity. How we live now is of critical importance in de­
termining how we will live and die in the future. The commitment to
the future can only be expressed in the here and now— in what we say 
and in what we do.
The spiritual and the materialist paths to happiness converge on 
the same road when we see that the realm of matter and the realm of
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spirit cannot be separated. There is no consciousness which is not 
embodied.
From Plato's Eros as the love of perfection and iirmortality to 
Marcuse's Eros as the free expression of human instincts, philosophy 
has moved from the idea of happiness to the search for its realization 
in society. Although Marcuse's transcendent project may be premature, 
given the attained level of consciousness and social organization, it 
nevertheless articulates the perennial protest against the subjugation 
of human desires to the interests of social domination. His critical 
theory may have come a hundred years too soon, or a thousand. We can 
only hope that his vision of social harmony and instinctual gratifica­
tion did not ccme too late to reverse the fatal dialectic of civiliza­
tion.
Herbert Marcuse's final vision of existence was profoundly anti- 
utopian. His analysis of the possibilities and the limitations to 
human happiness, however, makes it possible to continue his critical 
theory in light of the actual tendencies toward liberation existent 
within this culture. Such efforts would represent the ongoing caimit- 
ment of philosophy to happiness and would provide the basis for the 
further development of a critical theory of society.
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